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Abstract. Security Operation Centers are tasked with collecting and
analyzing cyber threat data from multiple sources to communicate warning messages and solutions. These tasks are extensive and resource consuming, which makes supporting approaches valuable to experts. However, to implement such approaches, information about the challenges
these experts face while performing these tasks is necessary. We therefore conducted semi-structured expert interviews to identify these challenges. By doing so, valuable insights into these challenges based on expert knowledge is acquired, which in return could be leveraged to develop
automated approaches to support experts and address these challenges.
Keywords: Cyber security · Cyber threat communication · Security
Operations Center · Data collection · Data analysis
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Introduction

Through the increasing digitalization across all aspects of life the threat posed
by cyberattacks is also increasing. The Federal Criminal Police Office in Germany (BKA) noted in their annually published Cybercrime Federal Situation
Report 2020 that 108,474 cases of cybercrime were registered while only 32.6 %
of these cases were solved. Compared to previous years, the number of criminal activities is constantly increasing at a higher rate than cases being solved
which highlights the severity of this type of crisis [1]. Thus, Security Operation
Centers (SOCs) have been established “as an organizational unit operating at
the heart of all security operations” with the objective to “detect, analyze, and
respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents employing people, processes, and
technology”[2]. Depending on their overall scope, SOCs offer both preventive, reactive and security quality services for specified stakeholders such as authorities,
citizens, or enterprises [3].

To achieve their objectives, SOCs can utilize different types of information and communication technologies (ICT), including Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) technology to “analyze security event data in real
time; and to collect, store, analyze and report on log data for regulatory compliance and forensics”[4]. However, as SIEMs focus on data from host systems and
applications, as well as network and security devices, they are not suitable to
monitor the threat and vulnerability landscape that is publicly discussed among
security experts. In complement, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) solutions allow to collect data from various open, public and social sources, including blogs,
feeds, newsletters, social media, and websites [5]. However, by including more
data, more resources and potentially tool support become necessary to handle
the influx of data which might not be available to SOCs [6].
There are different information systems (IS) facilitating the collection of open
[7] or social data [6], but they rely on information exclusively provided by accounts that were identified as experts in the field of cybersecurity. Furthermore,
some commercial tools such as “Buffer” and “Hootsuite” allow to automatically
post messages across different platforms, but do not provide technical support for
the automated creation of effective warning messages. To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of integrated tools tailored to the needs of SOCs, which
facilitate data collection, analysis and communication across different channels.
Our work is intended to work towards the creation of such a integrated approach
by uncovering challenges throughout the entire process, from data collection to
analysis and communication of the cyber situation. This leads to the following
research question: Which challenges do SOCs face when collecting and
analyzing data as well as communicating cyber situations?
In order to contribute to research in this field, we first conducted a literature
review to review related work on data collection, analysis, and the communication of cyber threat information (Section 2). We then performed semi-structured
interviews (Section 3) to identify areas of improvement in the collection and
analysis of data and communication of cyber situations based on information
acquired from cybersecurity experts (Section 4). We then discuss our findings
(Section 5) and conclude our paper by depicting the novelty of our findings as
well as outlining avenues for future research (Section 6).

2

Related Work

This section presents related work on the tasks of cyber threat collection, analysis and communication conducted by SOCs to enhance situational awareness
(SA) [8] amongst involved stakeholders, i.e., the SOC ifself (by threat collection
and analysis) and its clients (by threat communication). The term of cyber situational awareness was established as a subset of SA and is often related to knowing
what is happening in the own network [9], but also “requires to gain a common
operational picture of the threat environment in which the constituency is operating” [10]. In this work, we do not analyze the subset of network awareness,
but focus on threat awareness enabled by open, public and social data.

2.1

Collection and Analysis of Cyber Threat Information

The cybersecurity domain spreads its information on various closed and open
sources. While closed sources are protected by some kind of barrier, e.g., a paywall, open sources are open to any access. Although closed sources offer a niche
in the world of threat intelligence, since they offer distinct information, their
volume is much smaller than the available information in open sources [11]. Social media sources like Twitter do have a very active cybersecurity community,
which have been the focus of different studies in the past [12–19]. Especially
for the use cases of threat event detection [17, 19], exploit prediction [14, 15] or
hacker demasking [20] Twitter has been shown useful. Other sources in the domain of cybersecurity used for information extraction are blogs [21], bug reports,
and security advisories [22], forums [7], the dark web [7, 23], or official security
information sources like vulnerability databases [24].
When utilizing open sources to achieve cyber situational awareness, SOCs
face challenges due to the high volume, velocity, and variety of open and social
big data [25]. During daily monitoring tasks and large-scale incidents, the issue
of information overload becomes apparent, defined as “information presented at
a rate too fast for a person to process” [26, p. 823]. To mitigate the potential negative impact on decision making, several technical studies suggest to “transform
the high volume of noisy data into a low volume of rich content” [27, p. 1] which
is useful for response organizations. For instance, Mittal et al. [6] implemented
“CyberTwitter” to generate alerts for cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities
extracted from Twitter. Further studies highlight the relevance of a thought-out
usability, configurable filtering mechanisms, duplicate detection, grouping of similar messages, or information summaries as technological measures to overcome
information overload and prioritize relevant information [28–30].
Still, open sources are prone to information disorder [31], including misleading, fabricated or manipulated content. In social media, information quality has
been operationalised as a multidimensional construct of credibility, relevance,
completeness, comprehensibility, and timeliness of information [32]. While the
relevance and timeliness is addressed by data collection and filtering, existing
research shows that machine learning algorithms, indicator-based assistance systems, or the improvement of media literacy can contribute to the assessment of
credible information [33–35]. To ensure the completeness and comprehensibility
of information for situational awareness and decision-making [8], SOCs require
useful (visual) information overviews. For instance, Onorati et al. [36] provide
a semantic visualization tool for Twitter, which utilizes the principles of visual
analytics by combining “automatic analysis techniques with interactive visualisations for an effective understanding, reasoning and decision making on the
basis of very large and complex data sets” [37, p. 157].
2.2

Effective Cyber Threat Communication

Once SOC staff have gained an understanding of the current cyber situation,
the effective design and dissemination of cyber warning messages is of great

importance to reach as many affected stakeholders as possible and trigger security protection behaviors. Many IS studies on the effective design of cyber
warning messages are based on protection motivation theory [38–42]. According to this theory [43], effective cyber threat communication should convey a
high threat severity and actionable coping responses, so that fear is triggered
in those affected, but also self-efficacy that required actions can be carried out.
Johnston et al. [42] extended protection motivation theory and found that the
communication of informal sanctions imposed by peers increases the intention
to comply with security guidelines in organizations more than formal sanctions
enforced by the organization. Further studies showed that concrete fear appeals
with strong arguments increase protection motivation more than abstract fear
appeals with weak arguments [39–41]. Meanwhile, studies suggested guilt and
motivational appeals as more effective emotional appeals [38, 44].
Recent studies also emphasized the importance of actor-specific cyber threat
communication, as certain message characteristics were found to be more effective when they aligned with individual characteristics of affected stakeholders.
For example, Johnston et al. [45] found that an alignment of a fear appeal’s
rhetorical style (we vs. you) and organizational identification (low vs. high) increased security compliance behavior. Likewise, Plachkinova et al. [46] showed
that loss-framed messaging was more effective for end-users with low initial security concerns, while messages focusing on desirable outcomes were more effective
for end-users with high initial security concerns. With regard to the effective
dissemination of cyber warning messages, neuro information systems research
showed that a habituation effect already occurs after the second exposure, resulting in less attention being paid to the message [47]. In line with this, one
study presented polymorphic cyber warning messages as an effective measure to
counteract the habituation effect [48].
Previous research shows that effective cyber threat communication requires
a lot of effort from SOCs, as messages should ideally be tailored to different audiences and designed in different ways to counteract the habituation effect. This
highlights the importance of technological support for this work process, but
no solutions specifically for automated cyber threat communication exist at this
time. There are already commercial products that allow the automated distribution of messages on different social media channels (e.g., “Buffer”, “Hootsuite”),
but they do not provide support for actor-specific content adaptation.

3

Method

To identify requirements and areas that can be improved in SOCs, we conducted
semi-structured interviews with SOC members in Germany. This ensured that
valuable insights into cybersecurity as well as into the inner workings, needs, and
processes of SOCs could be gained. The interviews were conducted, recorded, and
transcribed in German. Our nine participants came from different SOC types,
i.e., authority-integrated units (P4, P5, P6, P9), a government-owned enterprise
(P2), and private service providers (P1, P3, P7, P8). Regarding their roles,

five of them acted as cyber incident responders (P1, P3, P6, P7, P8), three as
team leaders (P2, P4, P9), and one as public safety answering point for cyber
incidents (P5). We chose semi-structured interviews, because specific questions
for key areas where the experts’ contribution is important can be determined
in advance. Still, these also allowed the interviewer to ask follow-up questions if
the participant provided unforeseen insights.
The interview guide included 29 questions which can be divided into six
sections (see Table 1). The first section was dedicated to acquiring general descriptive information about the participant and their role in their organization,
while the second section aimed at gaining insights into the process of how organizational cyber incidents are reported. The third and fourth section dealt with
the collection of data on cybersecurity and the analysis of the cyber threat situation. Afterward, information about the communication of cyber threats was
acquired. Lastly, ethical, organizational, and legal aspects were addressed.
Table 1. Interview guide: sections and exemplary questions
Interview sections

Exemplary questions

Descriptive information
Reporting of organizational cyber incidents
Collection of data on cybersecurity
Situation picture for the
cyber threat situation
Communication of cyber
threats
Ethical, organizational,
and legal aspects

What does your normal day-to-day work usually look like?
What data do you need or transmit in order to deal with
cyber threats?
What data sources are you analyzing to identify these
threats and security vulnerabilities?
To what extent is a situation picture of a cyber threat and
security gaps created?
To what extent do you adapt cyber alerts to different communication channels and affected actors?
What are organizational and legal requirements for data
processing or stakeholder communication?

The interviews were conducted between February and April 2021 using Skype,
with a length between 59 minutes to 109 minutes. Prior to the interview the
questions were sent to the participants and they were given the chance to ask
questions via E-Mail to ensure that they comprehend them. Using MAXQDA,
the interviews were analyzed by means of a qualitative content analysis [49]. As
a first step in the coding process, the transcripts of three interviews were read
by four researchers and based on text fragments, each researcher inductively derived their own coding guide. These guides were discussed among the researchers
and combined into one coding guide, which then was used by one researcher to
label sections from all nine interview transcripts with matching codes from the
code guide. Afterward, a second researcher coded the transcripts with the same
coding guide. When differences in coding were found these differences were discussed until a uniform code was assigned. If a text section contained relevant
information that could be considered separately, multiple codes were assigned for

this section. In cases where multiple codes were assigned, a comparison between
these codes was made and when it was plausible they were merged to a superior
code category.

4

Findings

An overview of the ICT use of the German state SOCs we analyzed in our study
is depicted in Figure 1. The process can be divided into the steps of acquisition, analysis, and response. First, incidents are either reported by customers
(via mail or telephone) or detected by software (such as intrusion detection).
After initial information about the incident is gathered, SOCs use a ticketing
and reporting system to collect their evidence for incident response. Second, this
evidence is collected and analyzed using awareness-focused (e.g., manufacturer
websites, security advisory feeds, and social media channels such as Twitter
where data is collected manually) and collaboration-oriented (e.g., malware information sharing platforms, the collaborative chat of the German administrative
CERT network) channels. Third, the collected evidence is then used to inform
a certain stakeholder with specific recommendations, to provide (daily) reports
for selected stakeholders, or to issue a general warning for multiple stakeholders
in case larger-scaled ICT infrastructures are threatened.

Fig. 1. ICT infrastructure of German state-level SOCs

4.1

Collection of Open-Source Data

For the collection of open-source data legal restrictions such as for the automated collection and long-term storage of data were named as challenging
by six participants. One participant described the legal restrictions exemplary
for Twitter data as follows: “We are not allowed to read your Twitter account
automatically.The Office for the Protection of the Constitution says no. I can

however monitor your Twitter account manually but not automatically. There
are just too strong legal concerns.” (P3)
The lack of application programming interfaces (APIs) to acquire
data from different sources but also the heterogeneity available APIs and their
restrictions was described as another challenge in the data collection process by
four participants. One individual explained, “the data basis on which we carry
out our analyses is based on different data and our impression is all the interesting data, such as Instagram data, but also Facebook data are only available
to a limited extent, and it is a huge effort to get the relevant information” (P1).
Moreover, three participants expressed the diversity of data formats and
the lack of standardized incident reports as another significant challenge. This
increases the difficulty to collect and process data because “manufacturers are
constantly changing their formats, or they adapt them, i.e., you can’t even build
a tool that works, because then you have the problem that Microsoft suddenly
changes the format of their security information from one day to the next” (P2).
Lastly, the sheer number of available data sources was named as a challenge
by three experts. One of them elaborated that he has to visit “ 56 websites in
the morning, from software manufacturers, for example, to just look, are there
reports that have not yet been recorded” (P5)
With regard to potential for improvement, seven of nine experts highlighted
the automation of data collection and deletion of data that is not
needed anymore and explained that “if something existed, where the information provided by all kinds of people, for example from the top 100 security
experts worldwide, would be combined from social media. I think that would
be very, very helpful” (P7). In direct relation with the sentiment of combining
data four participants described the desire of unifying data streams by summarizing different data sources as a potential improvement area by further
conveying that “an analysis tool where various information channels converge
would be of course really attractive” (P1). Moreover, three experts expressed the
desire for a standardized format for data and reports because data from
different sources is also structured differently which makes it hard to automatically process. One participant further explained that the available information is
“extremely difficult to process automatically, that is the problem because they
are not beautiful Extensible Markup Language (XML) data, they are free texts
that are structured in completely different ways” (P2).
4.2

Analysis of the Cyber Situation

Five of the nine SOCs experts identified the high effort to assess data collected from different sources manually as a significant challenge for the
analysis of the cyber situation. One participant elaborated that “[. . . ] the processing of the filtered results is then a manual process [. . . ] we currently have
tweets from over 500 Twitter accounts, and of course they have also followers or
other sources so that an unbelievable amount of data is present” (P2). Related
to this, interviewees raised concerns about how to assess the trustworthiness

of sources and information since “it is, of course, possible that you have
information from a trustworthy partner, that is still false” (P2). In addition,
three experts named irrelevant and redundant information to be an issue
for the second category by exemplarily expressing that they “[. . . ] have to filter
out what is in the area of interest, what is not in the area of interest” (P6) and
“data that is collected twice or three times or comes in waves” (P9).
Moreover, four participants identified legal restrictions with regard to
personal data as a critical challenge for the analysis of the cyber situation
because these limit their possibilities for data analysis. It was stated that “the
e-government law has been in place since the beginning of the year. That puts
us quite tightly in terms of handling personal data. [. . . ] This means that if we
have to process such data, then we need the approval of a person who is qualified
to act as a judge” (P2).
Out of nine experts, four described the automatization of processes such
as the filtering of redundant data as an important improvement that they desired
for their current work. An expert elaborated: “It would be helpful if, at some
point, we had such a tool at our disposal, where incoming information could
be prepared and cataloged automatically. [...] But any help or support or automation would, of course, be very welcome at this point” (P4). In accordance,
P2 valued the idea of a visual dashboard which monitors different open data
(e.g., Pastebin, RSS feeds) and social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) sources,
if it supports the assessment of the criticality and urgency of information.
4.3

Communication of Cyber Threats

For the communication of cyber threats, six participants described reaching
specific target groups with warning messages as challenging because currently not all SOCs use multiple channels to reach specific groups. An expert
further described that depending on their IT knowledge and skills, users often
have additional questions when receiving a general warning message: “There are
often inquiries from individuals because the people out there are not all technically savvy, and then we have to give advice and provide support over the phone”
(P2). Furthermore, the effectiveness of a warning message and how to assess it were described as a challenge by five experts since message receivers do
not always follow the given advice. An expert explained: “the implementation of
given advice [...] is more likely to be the problem. The users on the other side of
the system might not see the urgency” (P5). Six experts found that their own
lack of knowledge about the software used by target groups and their
technical skills makes it challenging to identify relevant recipients for warning
messages: “So it’s just too much to know all the software we use here. I know
maybe 80 percent, maybe 90, but I can’t get to a hundred” (P3).
Moreover, three participants described the lengthy approval process of
warning messages as challenging due to having to wait for approval from
multiple individuals. “What is always very time-consuming from my point of
view is the internal approval of warning messages, because there are also other

things that the approving parties need to take care of” (P5). Lastly, in regard
to the communication of warning messages, three participants described the
manual effort needed to publish security warnings as a challenge. One of
them explained: “It is the case that an HyperText Markup Language (HTML)
code can be generated from the ticket, which then has to be imported relatively
easily, but manually, into the TYPO3 system. But this is important because this
TYPO3 system does not always do what it is supposed to do, and therefore you
sometimes have to readjust it manually” (P2).
Two experts described the desire for publishing security warnings automatically as an area of improvement, although they were not sure about the
technical implementation: “that [publishing warning messages] requires a lot of
manual effort, but there is probably no other way?” (P2). Furthermore, three
experts desired customizable warning messages for target groups in the
form of selecting keywords to generate a message for a group instead of writing individual messages. One expert described a potential form of automation
as follows: “The message is automatically created, through the case, category
and target being automatically identified [...]” (P4). Finally, two SOCs members wished for an approval platform for warning messages that speeds up
the approval process of a message, for example, by creating “[. . . ] a platform
on which to revise this document without constantly sending it back and forth.
Maybe that would make it a little easier” (P5).
Figure 2 shows which challenges could be potentially addressed by the suggested improvements.

Fig. 2. Mapping of challenges to improvement suggestions

5

Discussion

The interviews provide findings regarding challenges and areas for improvement
identified by SOCs experts for the collection of open-source data, analysis of the
cyber situation, and communication of cyber threats. For the communication of
cyber threats five challenges were identified wheras four challenges were named
for each remaining task indicating that currently each of these tasks is associated

by SOCs with hurdles. It can be deduced that the experts wish for improvements
for the collection of data and communication of cyber threats the most based
on the three improvements suggested for each category, compared to only one
improvement suggestion for the analysis of the cyber situation. These findings
underline that there is still a need for a tool or other measures to fully support
SOCs members in their daily work, starting from the collection and analysis of
data up to the communication of cyber threat information. An example for such
a tools architecture based on our findings is conceptually visualized in Figure 3.

Fig. 3. Exemplary tool architecture based on expert interview results

To address the challenge of various input formats for the collection of opensource data, a standardized form of incident reporting in a standardized data
format could be developed. However, this leads to the issue of how to motivate
the different data sources to use this form and format. A solution for this could
be to retrieve the data from different sources in their original form and to automatically transfer the information into the standardized format. Furthermore,
the experts named the sheer volume of data sources to be challenging in the data
collection process in alignment with Olshannikova et al. [25]. This issue could
be addressed by an application that as previously suggested collects data automatically from predefined sources in real-time with the addition of filtering and
deleting data that is not needed anymore as suggested by experts as a possibility
for improvement. This solution is in alignment with findings in previous studies
where similar suggestions to overcome information overload were made, such as
filtering and removing duplicate information [28–30]. The issues mentioned by
experts regarding the APIs, their variety, their scarcity, and the restrictions imposed on their use must be addressed with their corporate publishers because
they have the rights to address them. The legal restrictions for the automated
collection of data are determined by politicians and institutions, therefore, they
must be abided by while working with this type of data. However, a precautionary step to ensure the anonymity of users whose data is collected could be
by pseudonymizing the personal information of users before they are stored in

a database. By doing so, data that is not usable due to infringing on privacy
regulations could be made available for further use.These aspects are visualized
in the data collection section of Figure 3.
Regarding the analysis of the cyber situation, the experts named several
challenges that could be addressed by the desired automatization of processes
during the analysis section of their work. This includes challenges such as assessing the credibility of information as well as assessing its relevance. These
issues could be addressed by an application that automatically retrieves data
based on keywords and other parameters to obtain only relevant information
from predefined sources that the SOCs currently review manually. In order to
reduce false information and assess the trustworthiness of sources, the data from
one source could be cross-checked automatically with other sources and if the
information is reported by several sources, it can be considered credible together
with the source. However, the legal restrictions for the analysis of data are in
the hands of politicians and institutions, and are therefore outside the scope of
our abilities. But as previously suggested the pseudonymization of user information before storing and analyzing it could be an approach to address this issue.
These automatizations to address the challenges during the analysis process are
included in the data analysis section of Figure 3.
One major problem for the communication of cyber threats was described
to be reaching specific target groups with effective warning messages. Different
groups requiring different formulations and information as part of the message
which recognize their IT knowledge and skills. This issue can be addressed by
the suggested improvement of customizable warning messages for target groups
by creating an application with prewritten text fragments and related keywords
for each fragment so that a warning message can be generated for a threat and
group, by selecting relevant keywords. By creating messages tailored to target
groups the effectiveness of a warning message could be improved due to providing them with information that is relevant and understandable for them.
Different emotional appeals could be considered while creating these messages
for different target groups to increase the effectiveness of the threat message,
as was described in existing informations systems literature [38, 44–46]. Furthermore, the suggested solution to generate warning messages would also address
the challenge presented by the high manual effort necessary to create warnings by reducing the process of creating a message to selecting keywords and
proofreading the message before publishing it. To acquire knowledge about the
technologies used by the target groups and the effectiveness of a message, the
target groups must be further consulted. Lastly, to shorten the lengthy approval
process for warning messages that has been described as a challenge, a platform
could be created where parties approving an alert are able to make corrections to
the alert and approve it by signing off on the alert on the platform, rather than
sending alerts back and forth with suggestions and an approval alert. Fully automating the communication of a warning message seems currently not feasible
due to it requiring the approval from multiple individuals and multiple iterations. Additionally, patches for threats might not be available immediately and

the exploitation of a threat could possibly have dire consequences which makes
a careful assessment before communicating a warning message important. After
the approval of a message, it could be automatically published to predefined
channels to address the desire for automation for the publication of messages
that were expressed by participants. This would also further reduce the manual effort. These components of the communication process are display in the
communication of cyber threats section of Figure 3.
By conducting these interviews with SOCs experts an empirical research
contribution according to Wobbrock and Kientz (2016) is made through new
insights into challenges and areas where improvements are desired based on
the opinions of experts and by developing a conceptual tool architecture that
addresses these challenges and areas for improvements shown in Figure 3 [50].
They are focused on the collection and analysis of data and communication of
cyber situations. The practical implication of our research is that the additional
insights into these areas can be leveraged to implement new approaches as well
as to further improve existing ones such as “Discover” [7] and “CyberTwitter” [6]
for the execution of the above-mentioned tasks.

6

Conclusion

We identified multiple challenges and areas for improvement for SOCs when collecting and analyzing data as well as communicating the cyber situation through
expert interviews with SOCs members. We found multiple challenges and possibilities for improvements for each of these tasks and suggested possibilities for
addressing these challenges by bridging the areas for improvement with the challenges such as the development of a tool that automatically cross-checks retrieved
information about a threat with different sources to assess the trustworthiness
of the information and their source.
This study contributes to research by identifying these challenges and potential areas for improvement based on information provided by experts and SOCs
members. Furthermore, these areas for improvement and the suggestions made
for how to address them represent the practical implications of our work which
can be used to develop a tool to provide targeted support to SOCs employees
for example by implementing the conceptual tool described in Figure 3.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of our results is limited, due to the number of expert interviews conducted. The sample of interviews was purposefully
chosen, however, they only included SOCs from Germany which also presents a
limitation of our research since our results may not cover challenges and areas of
improvement perceived by SOCs members across the globe. The tool in Figure 3
has not been validated with experts yet. However, this will be done in future
work. Based on these limitations, we suggest that additional interviews should
be conducted with SOCs from different cultural backgrounds to strengthen the
findings of our work. Additionally, we suggest developing prototypes that address
our findings and presenting them in evaluation studies with SOCs.
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